

## ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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On the verge of the twenty-first century, we find ourselves in the midst of a global tectonic shift. The old order of industrial capitalism and monolithic nation-states is undergoing a transformation, and we do not yet know if the emergent post-industrial order will be a boon or a burden for humanity. We witness a continuing tendency toward market-driven transmutation of culture, in which a free-market economy is perceived to be the only road to democratic society and human flourishing, even as ethnic conflict and various forms of communalism reassert themselves throughout the world.

Economic globalization is showing itself to be an unbalanced process. A "global growing gap" defines relations between the North and the Global South. Cultural institutions and traditional structures of meaning are eroding in non-Western as well as Western contexts. While the affluent resort to the opiate of consumerism, ordinary people throughout the world are responding to experiences of insecurity by seeking to restore collapsed boundaries, to shore up or revive stable communal identities and systems of values. Through broad-based yet diverse social movements, they are seeking to meet the future on their own terms, and to avoid the prospect of remaining second-class participants in systems run according to the values and beliefs of others.

Islamic revival is such a defensive social and political movement, a broad-based reaction to Westernization, foreign manipulation, and internal malaise. Although its manifestations are remarkably widespread, Islamic revival is not a monolithic movement, nor is it reducible to the militant fundamentalism that captures the attention of the media. Among the world's historical powers, only the Muslims, as a people, have not reversed the decline in their global status. The Japanese, the Chinese, and the Europeans have all regained their world influence. The Islamic people are trying to preserve their culture and identity, and Islamic revival is a way of defining who they are.

The issues that motivate the Islamic revival are similar to those which provide impetus to revival in other religious and communal contexts. In fact, the tension between nationalism and religion in the Islamic world bears a similarity to a split in Israel. Everywhere there is a latent dissatisfaction with what materialist, consumer-oriented society offers, and with the failures of national governments to offer their peoples more than a medley of technological "fixes" which amount to tinkering with inefficient political, social, and economic institutions. To derive adequate and creative responses to this dissatisfaction, we will have to suspend certain habits of thought and perception, empathize with the historical and cultural

experiences of Muslims and other peoples, and envision more equitable and life-enhancing forms of intercultural cooperation.

## Recognizing Revivalism

### Two Faces of Fundamentalism.

The inadequacies of economic globalization and dominant Western conceptions of progress are increasingly recognized by advocates of interreligious solidarity and cooperation. Nonetheless, communalist reactions to the dislocations associated with modernization and development are usually viewed through culturally tinted lenses. If the language used by policymakers, policy analysts, and journalists is accepted as an indicator, "fundamentalism" seems to be filling a gap in the post-cold war vocabulary for security threats. The cold war has passed, but new cold wars are still thinkable.

Indeed, the term "fundamentalism," derived from the Western experience, has been applied to entire spectra of cultural, political, and religious activity. While the standards of academic research into fundamentalism have increased with the recent Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the term nonetheless remains limited by cultural and intellectual baggage. As the director of the project, Martin E. Marty, has himself suggested, "the study of fundamentalisms holds up a mirror to scholars in the West." To understand particularistic religious movements, we need to reflect more deeply on the outlooks and experiences of people who perceive themselves as revivers of religion. More often than not, what is called religious fundamentalism manifests under conditions of cultural, social, economic, and political marginalization. The defensive postures of certain religious and communal groups need to be understood in relation to that which provokes reaction. Concern about religious fundamentalism in the Islamic world and other locales should be tempered with reflection on an assertive type of political fundamentalism in the dominant Western culture, with its emphasis on materialistic science.

Insofar as we use the term "fundamentalism" in our Western discourse, we should use it evenhandedly and self-consciously. Fundamentalism can be defined as a kind of pathology of culture that arises when a group takes a subset of the basic tenets of a tradition, and either under the pressure of insecurity (in the case of Muslims, for example), or in the pursuit of hegemony (in the case of the West), uses them either to seek security by sealing off others, or to maintain dominance. In all conflict situations, people under stress react by reducing their own beliefs to a small, workable subset in order to fight and protect themselves. Fundamentalism, in this sense, implies a narrowing of the consciousness, and a closing off of the ability to hear and communicate. Yet, as we would like to underscore, a return to the larger frame of the culture and its humane values, always present if sought for, can open up the space for understanding, cooperation, or at the very least, deeper respect.

In the West, fundamentalism takes the form of cultural triumphalism. Cultural triumphalism is rooted in the prevailing Western vision of linear progress in which the institutions and cultural realities of the West become the model future for all of humanity, or at least the best possible future which could be expected. This attitude, expressed with varying degrees of subtlety, implies a fusion of Hellenic rationalism with Hebraic messianism, as well as a conflation of the West's deepest spiritual and humanistic values with

scientific materialism and existing forms of political, economic, and social life. The cultural triumphalist traces in his or her own cultural heritage a "great ascent" from backwardness, obscurantism, and tribalism, qualities which are in turn associated with those non-Western cultures which encounter difficulties while attempting to modernize. When assessing such cultures, the cultural triumphalist concludes that there is nothing to learn from them; modernization is prescribed as a way of adjusting to already-defined realities of state, nation, and economy. Valorization of cultural authenticity is associated with a risk of dangerous atavism, as the resources for betterment are believed to reside in the Western tradition. Democracy is reduced to minimum institutional requirements for effective participation in a global free-market economy; conflict resolution is understood as an engineering, isolating, mechanical process of adaptation and adjustment.

The perspective that Western culture is triumphant assumes that there are high and low culture forms -- specifically that high culture is derived from the Renaissance and Enlightenment of Western Europe and is automatically superior to other cultures. A literate culture, focused on abstraction and analysis, is superior to cultures based on anecdotal, folk, and oral traditions. Ethical and religious superiority are also identified with the dominant culture.

While the West has certainly made important contributions to global cultural resources -- among them the notion that religious and political institutions need not be fused -- the present overconfidence of the West manifests a reluctance to come to terms with, and trust in, cultural diversity. In recent years, much attention has been drawn to Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis. The notion of a "clash of civilizations" posits a contradiction between the epistemological and praxeological styles of the West and of the rest of the world. The West has little to learn and much to fear from the non-Western world; cultural diversity appears as a security threat.

At the present historical moment, the idea that the West has nothing substantive to learn from other civilizations is unhelpful, because it rules out partnership with other cultures. This makes it difficult for weaker, undervalued participants in the global cultural exchange -- in the present case the Muslims -- to perceive that they can do something besides merely "reflect or reject" the West. Hence, we would argue that just as the more intolerant and militant Muslim movements are unlikely to promote human flourishing, Western cultural triumphalism is also spiritually and humanistically unsound. Furthermore, the latter plays a role in producing the former, as Benjamin R. Barber has argued in his more balanced work, *Jihad vs. McWorld*. Barber argues that uncompromising commercialism and communalist rejectionism are but two faces of one process.

### Distinguishing Between Revivalism and Fundamentalism.

The essence of what is called fundamentalism, in its religious as well as secular manifestations, is an equation of substance with particular limited forms, a virtual absolutization of that which is finite and partial. On the one hand, religious fundamentalism searches for existential security by strengthening in-group/out-group boundaries and assuming a defensive or combative posture in relation to out-groups. Political fundamentalism, on the other hand, celebrates particular institutions while denigrating others, claiming that particular modes of human organization are the exclusive embodiments of such essential values as democracy, freedom, and truth. Both modalities of fundamentalism reduce idealized ends to

idealized means, forbidding alternative approaches. Each involves a proclamation that one road to truth is the only road to truth.

Islamic fundamentalism, as a vigorous, exclusivist reaction to a perceived external threat, must be differentiated from Islamic revivalism, a movement to renew the community from within. Islamic revivalism implies efforts to satisfy human needs for identity and community, for participation in development and politics, and for sacred meaning. Under conditions of cultural, economic, and political marginalization, large numbers of people are returning to deeply embedded religious discourses as they search for authentic values and alternative means of responding to their problems. There is a sense among many that traditions have not been vital for hundreds of years, and that Western ideologies have not worked. Muslims are struggling to move beyond the notion that they must either reflect or reject the West; they are not satisfied merely with a choice between Ataturk and Khomeini. Islamic revival spans the political and ideological spectrum, influenced as much by local sociopolitical conditions as by religious faith.

To grasp what is transpiring today in the Islamic world, a more nuanced appreciation of the Western experience is necessary. Although there are many writers who discuss the stamp of Calvinism on American and northern European cultures, the stamp of Islam on the Islamic culture area is not always appreciated with the same subtlety. Just as there have been fundamentalist and revivalist movements in the West throughout the modern era, there have been fundamentalist and revivalist movements in the Islamic culture area as well.

We have to accept the continued role of Islam in Islamic countries on its own terms, and not merely as the vehicle of "irrational," anti-modern extremism. Modernization theory, in this respect, is misleading, as it implies an artificial bifurcation between secularism and religiosity, in which the cutting edge of history renders religious movements and spiritual values insignificant, irrelevant, or illegitimate. Ironically, some ("orientalist") refutations of the relevance of conventional modernization theory in the Middle East maintain the same evaluation of the relative merits of secularly versus religiously defined culture, while simply appending a cruel exceptionalism for Muslim countries, which are "not ready for democracy" because they cannot implement the Western model. This analysis denies the dynamism of cultural and religious traditions and the possibility of democratic forms evolving organically out of a context of meaning familiar to people at the grassroots. Secular values of economic growth, individual choice, and technological progress are equated with modern, humane values, and Islamic values are associated with stasis and stagnation.

Contemporary thinking exhibits an understanding of the role of political and economic institutions in democracy, but a less sophisticated understanding of the role of social institutions. In the Middle Eastern context, we know that the institutions of democracy are not well grounded and that economic maldistribution is pervasive, but we have not devoted enough attention to social organization at the local level. Although local social institutions are imperfect, they do allow for the discussion of issues affecting people's lives. It is at this level that the language and values of Islam are most significant and authentic, and at which the gap between the formal institutions of state and the networks and realities of everyday life is most evident. Islamic social institutions are more dynamic and variegated than is generally recognized.

In addition to its social functions, religion serves an important, practical role in politics by offering recourse to a transcendental order -- an order to which the Pharaoh can be held accountable. The oppressed can defend their rights by appealing to religious standards, to the divine will as it is understood. When the ruling regime persists in corruption and repression, Islam offers a vocabulary of resistance.

Islamic revivalism is not the enemy of the West. It is not even an entirely religious movement, nor is it, as some fear, monolithic and expansive. Islamic revivalists are seeking to restore an old civilization, not to create a new empire. As Michael E. Salla has suggested, it is worthwhile to consider Islamic revivalism in comparative perspective, as a "regional variation of a global religious revivalism that promulgates a normative perspective that critiques liberal democratic norms." The different regional and local variations of revivalism no doubt exhibit somewhat different tendencies and perspectives, and all are worthy of further investigation. The present case of Islamic revival sheds light on issues facing humanity as a whole. We are being challenged to resolve intercultural conflicts by respecting demands for cultural authenticity and human dignity within our emerging global civilization.

## The Islamic Revival

### The Roots of Rivalry and Revival.

Beginning with the Treaty of Karlofca in 1699 and later the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarca in 1774, the Ottomans retreated from Europe and Muslims were reduced to passivity in world politics. They were excluded from history. Their destinies were determined by the West. The rules and practices of current international relations reflect nineteenth-century Western experience and interests. Thus, the common bonding of the world today is the product of the conquest and acculturation into Western civilization of Islamic and other non-Western elites that occurred as the result of the West's political and economic expansion. The common language of the world has become largely Western in both form and content.

Cultural contact in this context of unequal political and cultural relations has blemished the exchange between Islam and the West. It has left the latter arrogant and insensitive and the former defensive and insecure. The sense of triumphant culture has become a profound source of conflict between the West and Islam. By asserting that what is right, true, and real is the same for everyone in the past, present, and future, cultural triumphalism favors and reinforces Western cultural values and styles and produces a displacement of Islamic culture. The continued triumph of Western civilization is sustained through the use of mass media and educational systems, as well as by control of the symbols of legitimacy and status.

When independent Islamic states emerged following World War I and later World War II, the West expected that they would become its imitations; so did the Muslims. The first modern Islamic state, Ataturk's Turkey, embarked on a relentless campaign after World War I to sever that country's Islamic roots. After World War II, Ali Jinnah's Pakistan became the first country to declare itself Islamic, but it was so in name only. In reality, Pakistan was an adaptation of the Western nation-state system, moving in its postwar history from Jinnah through Ayub Khan to Bhutto and then to Zia's zealotry. In the same postwar period, Iran's history moved from the Shah through Bazargan and Bani Sadr to the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The establishment of modern Turkey and other nation-states in the Islamic world accompanied and accelerated intellectual and political discontinuity with basic values of Islam. Traditional Islamic institutions lost their effectiveness as organizing principles and as safeguards for social justice and political participation. The shariah (religious law) that served as a protective code for individual Muslims since the seventh century has suffered either from total neglect or from political opportunism. The universalism of Islam has not found expression in the new nation-states.

In fact, it is possible that Islamic rule has never been realized since the Prophet Muhammad's death. Two and possibly three of the Prophet's successors, the khalifah (caliphs), were assassinated, and this history leaves no unanimity among the faithful about the nature of Islamic rule. Politics was marked by power struggles according to the rules of the profane world. Islam has been used by those in power to maintain themselves and by those aspiring to power to legitimize themselves, and here lies the present danger: that resorting to such religious justification for secular ends runs the risk of absolutism. There is always the risk that those in power could claim to be wielding dominion on behalf of God and could therefore assume absolute power over their political opponents. In the Islamic world, politics has always been confounded with religion in this way.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, internal conflicts in the West and the assimilation and diffusion of Western technology within the Islamic world have redressed the balance between these two cultures. Among other adjustments, there has been a somewhat slow growth in the tide of self-confidence, as Islamic peoples rediscover the inherent worth of their own cultures. Probably the most dramatic example is the awakening still underway in the multifaceted revival that is called Islamic fundamentalism by Westerners. This revival combines a rediscovery of the vitality of the Islamic experience with a determination not to submit any longer to the cultural humiliation of judging oneself by Western standards.

Today is a period of rapid social change in the world of Islam. The present experience of Muslims with Western cultural supremacy complicates the task of transition, because Western attitudes reinforce an alien system of values and thus accelerate the displacement of Islamic cultural norms that are already weakened. New symbols of legitimacy and status -- wealth and nation-state -- are introduced while many Muslims lose faith in their cultural heritage. Islam now faces the greatest challenge in its existence.

### The Present Islamic Awakening.

Contemporary Islamic revival is based on a long history of responses to the challenges encountered by Islam. Traditionally, Islam has provided two channels of response to challenges: tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform). Among the most famous historical proponents of renewal are Muhammad al-Ghazzali, Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ahmad Sirhindi. During the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, al-Ghazzali reconciled mysticism with mainline Islam. Two centuries later, Ibn Taymiyyah dealt with the challenge of idolatry and social upheaval brought on by the Mongolian invasion. During the sixteenth century, Mughal emperor Akbar sought to respond to the pluralism of Indian society by promoting a vision which emphasized the Islamic spirit of universalism at the expense of established religious forms, but Sirhindi opposed this and sought to defend boundaries between Hinduism and Islam.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Islamic world had to respond to Western institutions and culture. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Islamic reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, impressed by European scientific and social advances, began an agonizing appraisal of the declining conditions in the Islamic world. A new school of thought, salafiyah (Islamic reformist), developed. Its aim was the reconciliation of Islamic precepts and Western social organization. In the early twentieth century, Hasan al-Banna moved Islamic revival from the realm of individual reforms to a popular movement by introducing the concept of mass organization. Sayyid Qutub, successor of al-Banna, built upon the latter's contribution by using the tool of ideology in an amalgam of Fascist and Marxist organizational principles. Islamic revival was transformed into a political movement exemplified in the emergence of the Green Shirts and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in the array of Islamic groups that continue to develop through today's Islamic world, including the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Islamic Group in Egypt, and al-Nahdah in Tunisia.

Islamic revival is a powerful and multifaceted movement that touches upon every aspect of life for Muslims. There is great diversity within and among the various Islamic groups, reflecting local, national, cultural, and economic realities.

Unfortunately, there is a growing tendency in the West to lump all Islamic movements together, thus narrowing Western understanding of the full range of Islamic forces at work. When Americans attack fundamentalism or Islamically oriented governments, they are assaulting, among others, allies of the United States such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Iraq and Syria, two countries usually perceived as among America's most dangerous adversaries, are the most secular of the Arab states. Like the media, American policymakers have often proved to be surprisingly myopic, tending to view the Islamic world and various groups within it solely through the prism of extremism and terrorism. While this may be understandable in light of events in Algeria and in the occupied territories of Palestine and Lebanon, it fails to do justice to the complex reality of Islamic revival and undermines American interests in the Middle East and the Islamic world.

Common to advocates of Islamic revival, or Islamicists, is the affirmation of an Islamic ideological alternative to secular nationalism, Western capitalism, and socialism. In the Middle East, the failures of pan-Turanism (unity of the Turks), pan-Arabism (Arab unity), Arab nationalism and socialism, and Iranian nationalism have left an ideological vacuum. Far from a monolithic reality, Islamic revival is as diverse as the countries in which it is occurring. It spans the political and ideological spectrum, influenced as much by local sociopolitical conditions as by religious faith. For example, women serve in the security system of Muammar Qadhafi's populist Libya, yet women cannot drive vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Women enjoy voting rights in Pakistan and Iran but are disenfranchised in Sudan.

Despite vast disparities in attitudes, Islamicists hold in common a set of ideological beliefs. They view Islam as total way of life, for personal conduct and for the conduct of state and society. Westernization is regarded as the primary cause of the political, economic, and social ills of Muslim societies. Finally, followers of the Islamic revival movement believe that the introduction of the shariah will produce a moral, just, and self-reliant society.

Islamicists in the Islamic Group, al-Jihad, Hezbollah, the Armed Islamic Group, militant factions of Hamas, and an array of small radical organizations go beyond the above principles to see Islam and the West as involved in a historical power struggle of considerable duration, beginning with the Crusades and

continuing under European colonialism, Zionism, and American imperialism. The West, especially the United States, is blamed for its support of unjust regimes in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and the Arab states of the Gulf; for its unconditional support for Israel; and for its backing of the military usurpation of civilian government in Algeria. These radical groups, therefore, consider violent struggle against unjust rulers and those governments that support them as a justifiable strategy.

Islamic ideology and movements, or Islamism, have become an integral part of Islamic society and will inform future Islamic domestic and international politics. Islamists are found among the Western-educated as well as the untraveled, among literates and illiterates, transcending all classes, professions, and gender and age groups. The power of Islamic revival is manifested in many ways. Candidates running as Islamists have successfully entered elections in Kuwait, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Tunisia. The revival has produced a new class of modern and educated Islamist elites who are no less visible than their secular counterparts and in every way as competent.

Islamic revival has developed into a broadly based social movement, functioning today in virtually every Islamic state and in communities around the world. The goal of this revival is to transform society through the transformation of individuals. Organizations known as Da'wah (Islamic call) exist at all levels of education, in all forms of communication, in banks and investment houses, in every type of social services, and in the police and military. Student associations are present in every Islamic country and elsewhere. Indeed, Islamic revival has produced a new generation of Islamists in every profession at every level in the Islamic world.

## Beyond Confrontation, Toward Complementarity

### The Need for Dialogue.

The present relationship between the West and Islam resembles a fruitless debate. In this relationship, the inability of each party to hear the other only reinforces stridency and incomprehension. There continues to be a need to move beyond facile, stereotypical language and judgments. Stereotyping distracts the West and Islam from the search for a common ground. The West and Islam need to break the twin cycles of arrogance, which breeds contempt, and defensiveness, which fosters paranoia. The West should take the initiative because it is secure enough to do so. On the other hand, the Muslims should not be so insecure as to believe that they can only reflect or reject the West. The enduring strength and creative genius of authentic Islam can absorb the shocks of Western intrusions. Muslims can accept those creations of the West that are sure to complement the inevitable revitalization of Islam.

The Muslim image of the West is colored simultaneously by envy and admiration, fear and suspicion. Among most Muslims, Western civilization is seen as an example to be copied. Western technological, economic, and political achievements are appealing, while cultural penetration and the assertion of Western military, political, and economic power underscore Muslim fears. When Muslims look at Western materialism, they see cultural decadence.

The United States, the industrial nations of Europe, and Japan can participate in a potentially positive dialogue with Islam. In an effort to facilitate the articulation of social and political goals, the industrial

nations could support Muslim efforts to develop democratic forms that are appropriate to their needs, to rediscover the life-affirming side of Islamic precepts, and to develop structures that promise a cultural future for the people and not merely a technological future that negates their values. By setting this as the agenda, the industrialized nations could participate in the reconstruction of an Islamic world that is nonviolent, stable, and productive.

### Rethinking Democracy and Development.

It is particularly self-defeating to exclude Islamicists if they are willing to participate in democratic politics. The central issue raised by the Islamic movements -- the future of development in the Muslim world -- is legitimate. By repressing Islamic voices, existing elites force the Islamic impulse into narrower channels characterized by violence and extremism. The United States should encourage Muslim governments to enter into dialogue with Islamicists. The exclusion of the people of the Muslim world from active participation in political life undermines global stability.

The reconciliation between Islam and democracy is a crucial first step toward peace and stable progress. Democracy, Western or Islamic, is not practiced anywhere in today's Arab world. Does it follow that Islam and democracy are not compatible? The answer is no. The practice of democracy is always less tidy than its definition, but its practice is more dynamic than its formal description and prescription. There are democratic precepts in Islam just as there are in other religions. There are also Islamic traditions, as in other religions, which in practice result in transgressions against democratic ideals. The claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy equates Western (liberal) institutional forms of democracy with the substance of democracy. The substance of democracy is a human society that has a sense of common goals, a sense of community, wide participation in making decisions, and protective safeguards for dissenters. The form of democracy, on the other hand, is cast in the mold of the culture of a people.

There is nothing in Islam that precludes common goals, community participation, and protective safeguards. It is true that Western liberal forms of democracy, with their provisions for political parties, interest groups, and an electoral system, are alien to Islamic tradition. But democracy is not built upon institutions; it is built upon participation. The absence of democracy in Islamic countries is more the result of lack of preparation for it than of lack of religious and cultural foundations. Democratic traditions in Islam, however, have been more commonly abused than used.

Currently, the door is open for a new thinking and reconceptualization regarding democracy. We should factor into this new thinking consideration of the roles of the community, the tribe, the individual, the state, and religion, so that we can go beyond the Western-based concepts of democracy.

"Developed" -- modern and democratic -- can also mean "Muslim." Currently, there is no available model for "modern, democratic, and Muslim" advanced by modernized Muslim thinkers. At the close of the nineteenth century in Egypt, liberal thinkers began to accept the Western democratic norm as reality. In so doing, they began to hang Islamic garb on Western concepts. It did not work then, and it is doubtful that it will work now. Muslims need to reexamine and reconstruct an Islamic idea of what is modern and Islamic.

The process of change has blurred the distinctions between modernization and development in the Islamic world. The developmental process is the way in which society and its members seek to reach their potential -- a process with a goal, even if the goal is perceived as an ever-receding one. True, there is always a utopia by which this process is measured, one extracted from the experience of people and generalized into a vision of the desired society. However, since experience is constantly enlarged, it is natural that the utopian ideal changes. How we manage the tension between theory and practice, between reflection and experience -- our praxeological style -- determines how well we keep the dream alive. If we fail, the dream becomes a nightmare.

Modernization is the adoption of modern technologies for the uses of society. It attempts to make society more rational, efficient, and predictable, especially through the use of comprehensive planning, rational administration, and scientific evolution. Modernization also carries the connotation of a more productive society, at least in economic terms. Like development, modernization is always at least a partially conscious effort by some who have a vision of what modern society would look like. In the Islamic world, societal values are excluded from emerging patterns of development.

Modernization is not a substitute for development, but in much of the Islamic world, development is simply identified with modernization imposed from above without the construction of a popular base of support. Social justice and political participation in the Islamic world are sacrificed for modernization. The vitality of the vision of development can be derived only from the cultural reality of Islamic experiences. It cannot grow from either Western liberalism or some variety of socialism. Regardless of time and place, individuals and cultures must sweat out their own development to insure the greater expansion of their identity and dignity.

There is a tremendous amount of thinking to be done about development and Islam, precisely because Muslims are forced by today's conditions to make the connection between two worlds. The Islamic economic doctrine of the shariah is compromised by traditionalist-capitalist and secularist-socialist states alike. Present-day Islamic countries do not practice Islamic precepts patterned after the shariah. The socialists and secularists deny that religious law has strategic utility in modern materialism. The capitalists and traditionalists have the shariah out of its original shape. This perceived irrelevance of Islamic precepts to present conditions, whether implicit or explicit, has not been accompanied by indigenous intellectual development. The Islamic idea of development cannot be reduced to any of the existing models that prevail in the West today, where ultimately economic reasoning guides development policy, where it is appropriate to resolve social issues by economic rationality, and where consumerism is equated with happiness. Especially today, when many people in the West are trying to rethink the meaning of development to accommodate ecological and social criteria, Muslims need to reexamine and reconstruct an Islamic idea of development as well.

Islam and development can be reconciled when we free development from the linear, rational idea of progress canonized by the Western mind. The European Enlightenment postulated progress as the person's domain in nature established by reason and science. "Progress" was abandoned when the concept became a little too hollow to use -- a trifle too obviously laden with Western superiority -- and the concept of "development" was substituted in its place.

In the Islamic world, three possibilities for development must be examined: (1) a retaking of the road of "Westernizing," assuming the contradictions in the Western camp between liberals, Judeo-Christians and

Marxistsocialists can be resolved; (2) an acceptance of the hegemony of one of the Western groups or of a non-Western worldview; or (3) participation in the construction of truly eclectic, humanistic world culture. Only the third possibility will provide space for the growth of a truly Islamic model of development.

The inexorable dynamics of modern history rule out any pretensions by any group of establishing a world hegemony. Furthermore, it is obvious that such a view of a triumphant power is really alien to the genius of the three Western subcultures. The Judeo-Christian tradition insists that believers must always be open to new revelations of truth; liberals hold that reason and science march hand in hand toward a world brotherhood and sisterhood in which all will participate; and the Marxist-socialists believe in a scientific method that, if truly open-ended and able to move forward dialectically, will abandon dogmas outflanked by the advance of knowledge and the extension of human community.

The incompatibility of Islam with present economic requirements has resulted in frustration and cynicism. Amidst economic uncertainty, there has been lip service to Islam, capitalism, and socialism, combined with the failure to conform to the precepts of any of the three. Within this context, contemporary Islamic politics is thwarted and diverted by the personal interests of ruling elites.

The picture that emerges of government practices in the Islamic world bears little resemblance to Islamic precepts of social justice and political participation. Nor does it bear a likeness to Western liberal or socialist preferences. The tension between precept and practice has resulted as much from slow adaptation to rapidly changing conditions within Middle Eastern societies as from the impact of powerful ideas and forces from the West. Contradictions within Muslim societies have stifled creativity; indigenous intellectual developments have been few and frequently suppressed by governments. Khomeini's Shiite fundamentalism and the assortment of Sunni revival movements in the Arab world are the creation of these contradictions.

Neither the zealous nor the imitative responses of Muslims to the challenge of the West represent genuine revivals of Islamic civilization; rather, they evince negativism and identification with the "enemy." What is required is an Islamic alternative that is neither a superficial compromise nor a schizophrenic reaction -- a response based on Islamic values that reflects the historical development of Islam while also responding to the challenges of contemporary life.

In the long run, it is better for the Islamic world to develop through its own Islamic traditions. Otherwise, Muslims will always be torn between traditionalism and secularism, between fundamentalism and Westernism. A change through continuity is more viable than a change through discontinuity. The challenge for Muslims is to develop the Islamic world through its own traditions, not through Western secular ideologies. The former are rooted in the heart of the people as mass culture, while the latter are uprooted from mass culture and can easily be seen as external penetration.

### Islamic Contributions to World Order.

Because Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful political precepts and practices with universal implications, Islam can also make important contributions to an integrated world order -- one that affirms

the unique value of all cultural traditions. In particular, Islam prescribes a strong sense of community and solidarity of people; it postulates a collaborative concept of freedom; and it demystifies the Western myth of triumphant material progress.

Islam sees the individual as the trustee of God's bounty. Individuals are required to lead a good life and to promote good deeds in the community, or ummah. Promotion of the community is an act of faith (iman) advocated in the Qur'an (the holy book of Islam) and Sunnah (practices of prophet Muhammad). The principle of social fraternity (ikha ijtimai) defines the way Muslims organize themselves.

Islam views the community as a group of people cooperating for the sake of the common good, relying on the use of shared resources to achieve viability and creativity. A community is based on production to satisfy its needs; production requires regulations, and regulations lead to the establishment of a political system. The Islamic political system is the form of authority designed to regulate, direct policy, create just laws applied equally to all persons, and secure peace. The purpose of peace is the creation of harmony.

The Western liberal emphasis on personal freedom from restraint is alien to Islam. While in the liberal tradition personal freedom signifies the ability to act and is held in highest esteem, in Islam it is the ability to be or to exist that is foremost. Personal freedom in the latter view lies in surrendering to the divine will and is sought within oneself. It cannot be realized through liberation from external sources of restraint. Individual freedom ends where the freedom of the community begins.

From an Islamic perspective, being free means belonging to the community and participating with others in cultural creation. Freedom of thought, communication and expression are all seen as absolutely necessary to achieve the highest level of self-renewing creativity, as is social, economic, and political equality of opportunity and dignity. Western liberalism posits freedom in order to avoid a despotic system, whereas Islam emphasizes virtue to perpetuate the traditions of society, which Islam often values as collective good. To some, such an approach denies the essential characteristics of freedom, for belonging to a community consciously demands some discipline and sacrifice. Yet the cultural anarchy of individualistic liberalism in the West is inconsistent with social balance. Furthermore, it has been oversold as a creative seedbed of culture and does not take into account the potential for creativity of noncoercive communities.

Societies have so often been repressive that a strong Western tradition has emerged that sees the elimination of repression and want as the chief goal of society. A false dichotomy has thus developed, with society seen as serving the individual. Too often -- indeed, almost entirely -- the cultural community in which most human realization must take place has been ignored. It is true that cultural systems, like political, economic, and social ones, have usually contained much to impede human development: forces such as prejudice, chauvinism, competitiveness, racism, sexism, and so on. This does not change the fact that the cultural community must be served by political, economic, and social systems, rather than the reverse.

There are many roads to humanistic cultural pluralism, many potential systems of communitarian, free, creative life, and many potential languages, arts, musics, dramas, and literatures that are compatible with humanistic ethics. No doubt, every community needs some "cultural revolution" to remove those things that dehumanize society or inhibit human development. But creativity and cooperation will only have a chance to replace conformity and competition as it becomes clear that the cultural community is the

principal source of human realization. The enhancement of cultural communities at all levels of human organization, therefore, is necessary for moving beyond mutually negating fundamentalisms and towards coexistence.

In the Western pluralistic tradition, diversity is seen in terms of the coexistence of political systems but not of cultures. Cultural pluralism is rooted in an Islamic tradition of ethnic diversity that fosters a universalist tendency toward cultural broadness and flexibility. This heritage has allowed autonomous non-Muslim cultures to flourish within Islam to this day, while the West has succumbed to the destruction of native cultures and to sporadic, but virulent, antisemitism.

There is here a real opportunity for leadership. Today's challenge for Muslims is no more than the expansion of the original ideas of Islam. As Muslims seek to harmonize the Islamic spirit of communalism with the changing conditions of their own societies, they contribute to the betterment of our world.

The afflictions of triumphalism, cultural imperialism, and communal reaction undermine the viability of development -- nationally, regionally, and globally. A retreat to a cultural ghetto by any group, be it Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, or Hindu, is not only a denial of the rich diversity of the modern cultural experience, but also a rejection of responsibility for future generations. The inexorable dynamics of modern history rule out pretensions by any one group or cultural tradition of establishing a world hegemony. We have moved from a humanity that experienced its collective life as fragments of the whole to a humanity experiencing itself as whole.

First, second and third worlds must become one world. Oppressors and oppressed must be seen as people; reason and intuition become faces of truth; planning and spontaneity become reality; civilization and barbarism become culture; propositional knowledge and anecdotal knowledge become the root of knowledge. World order becomes a historical process whereby human beings choose and create their future within the context of their environment to achieve a humanist and creative society. World order becomes a creative community.

### Learning Cooperation Through Consensus

The only workable instrument for the conciliation between the West and Islam and, for that matter, for the ratification of interstate decisions in the emerging world order, will be a broad consensus of peoples and governments. The first truly global political community has begun to emerge around us. What we in the international-relations field called the interpenetration of states in recent decades has probably evolved so far as to be irreversible. In fact, it is ultimately inaccurate to speak of the West as distinct from Islam, or of Islam as opposed to the West. These clumsy distinctions are more appropriate as generalizations of popular mythology than as descriptions of actual international politics. The recent manifestations of neoconservatism in the West and religious revivalism in many parts of the world are masking the scale of global transformation now underway. Political rhetoric is essentially backward-looking: it translates contemporary issues into political distinctions of the past. This reactionary bias of political rhetoric is not the monopoly of practitioners of world politics. Media pundits and professional analysts are as much -- if not more -- the victims of rhetorical anachronisms.

Consensus, the distinctive political tool in relations among equals, has already gone far to replace armed force as the preferred instrument of national policy. "Realists" may object to the naïveté, the instability, or the shortsightedness of some manifestations of consensus, but it would be sheer folly to challenge either its existence or its power. The process of consensus is such a new method of reaching binding international decisions that mistakes and contradictions in its application are inevitable. Trial and error -- seasoned by patience -- will teach Westerners and Muslims the elements of an operational code to govern the new process, and consensus will become a more efficient and predictable instrument.

Consensus does not demand a radical transformation of the global system. Most of the old ways of thinking and acting in world politics will be useful in the future. Negotiation, persuasion, accommodation, and even certain forms of coercion will remain as standard features of interstate life. The loss of the ability to force a verdict by war will do little more than impose one more limitation on the practice of statecraft -- a more fundamental inhibition than any the system has accepted up to this point, it is true, but nevertheless one that will leave room for vigor, imagination, and skill in framing and executing national policy.

The process of consensus does, however, underscore the obsolescence of the competitive model which has long dominated the practice of international relations. The competitive model is predicated upon the assumption that competition among nations, all pursuing their own self-interest, will, through Adam Smith's "invisible hand," miraculously lead to the increasing betterment of everyone. Consensus introduces a cooperative model of world politics which focuses on the benefits of international stability in the global system. No one country can impose it by itself. In fact, everyone has to make sacrifices. The cooperative model departs from the zero-sum, competitive power-politics model where one nation gains and the other loses, and moves toward common action resulting in mutual benefits.

In economics, the competitive model has functioned well to explain the provision and distribution of private goods. It served the very important function of guiding the stimulation of economic expansion and development. The problem is that the model simply failed to explain voluntary cooperation to provide public goods, as opposed to private goods. Public goods are those that are shared and enjoyed by a large number of people. Public goods cover a wide area of Western-Islamic relations including international management of energy resources, common security and the avoidance of Armageddon, and morality. Morality, which consists of ethical rules to guide our conduct, is something that everyone benefits from and that no individual can provide alone. It requires continued cooperation by everyone holding the ethical system in order to maintain it. Yet, in general, everyone has a temptation to let everyone else behave ethically and to exploit that behavior by taking advantage of the other people.

Voluntary cooperation to provide public goods, it seems, cannot be explained by simple self-interested behavior. It requires some minimal ethical assumption. Ethics can be seen as motivated not by pure altruism, but by a more enlightened self-interest, based upon a more inclusive conception of the self or of the community, in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world. An ethical assumption to begin with is the existence of a norm of fairness, a norm that requires an individual to bear a share of the cost that is borne by those who are also cooperating in an action, rather than simply taking a free ride, as self-interest would dictate.

What are some of the characteristics of cooperation based on fairness that would be relevant to intercultural and interreligious cooperative relations? In the first place, such cooperation requires the identification and acceptance of shared objectives that can only be reached through cooperative efforts. Second, all of the potential cooperators have to have an expectation of personal benefit from this cooperative effort: they are not obligated by fairness to contribute to an enterprise from which they expect to get nothing back. A third important aspect of voluntary cooperation based on fairness is that there must be a fair distribution of the benefits and costs of cooperation. Questions of international social justice cannot be avoided. For example, we simply cannot expect Muslims -- who see themselves in a position of weakness relative to the West and feel they are being repressed -- to be willing to make any significant sacrifice of their own self-interest to benefit Western nations.

Let us emphasize that fairness is an ethical norm, which at times requires that we set aside simple self-interest in order to adhere to it. The norm of fairness, however, does not require unilateral self-sacrifice. It is not a norm of pure altruism. Fair individuals are obligated to contribute to a cooperative effort only if they can expect to receive benefits from the like contributions of others. This is a key characteristic of the underlying concept of reciprocity -- the obligation to return a favor, or not to take advantage of someone who has done you a favor. In the case of Islam and the West, both Westerners and Muslims have to have an expectation of receiving benefits from the cooperation of others.

Because of the mutual expectation of benefits, cooperation based on fairness requires mutual trust. Since no one party can force any of the others to cooperate, and since each one has a selfish temptation not to cooperate, each must trust the others not to take advantage of both the opportunity and the temptation to cheat. Cooperation, then, requires mutual expectation of a willingness to sacrifice short-term self-interest for the common good.

Cooperation based on fairness involves some risk because there is a need to rely on mutual trust. The more confidence one has in the trustworthiness of the other cooperators, the less this risk will be. The role of fairness in the game is to obligate participating groups not to take advantage of each other in a risky situation. It is sometimes necessary to build a basis for trust by starting with relatively low-loss, low-risk cooperative ventures and working up to bigger, higher-payoff, but higher-risk enterprises.

A related problem is the double standard of morality often used. People often have one standard of ethics with regard to their in-group, however that is defined, and a different standard of ethics with regard to their perceived out-group. This may be one of the greatest challenges in building Western-Islamic and global cooperation, because people tend to draw their in-group lines, at the farthest extent, at their own national or cultural borders.

Though having shared objectives that benefit everyone is a necessary precondition for cooperation, it is not sufficient. There is a crucial role for leadership in converting shared objectives and a shared norm of fairness into effective cooperation. Leadership is needed to establish the mechanisms for cooperation and to ensure that efforts will be coordinated and that they will succeed. Leadership also has an important part in the formulation of common objectives in the first place. Mechanisms for cooperation must be established that determine the fair allocation of benefits and burdens, and identify the roles and responsibilities of the cooperative enterprise. Another role of leadership is to promote the development of solidarity. Solidarity is necessary for the underlying norm of fair reciprocity to be effective. Finally,

leadership has the role of setting an example of sacrifice of immediate self-interest in furtherance of common goals.

The building of cooperation on the basis of consensus, fairness, and trust is important not only for generating utilitarian responses to pressing global problems, but also for renewing the world's cultural, religious, and spiritual traditions from within. Through investigating the challenge of revivalism, we arrive at an issue of even broader significance: the need for cultural disarmament and nonpartisan spiritual values. To move beyond fear and distrust and provide scope for both universality and cultural authenticity, we will ultimately need to draw on the essential wisdom that is the common heritage of all humankind, which Aldous Huxley and others have referred to as the "perennial philosophy." While, exoterically, the religions of the world are many, esoterically they are one: they arise from and return to a common source, and possess within themselves the resources for an extended epistemology by means of which the unity of existence may be discovered and the human personality transformed. It is by means of this unifying, perennial philosophy -- which underscores the mystical, or spiritual dimension of religion -- that we may come not only to cognize, but also to feel and experience, that the whole world needs the whole world. To evoke the vision of Ibn 'Arabi, a 13th-century Muslim philosopher, the whole of existence is reflected in the parts, and from the parts we gain the information to reconstruct an ever-greater whole. It is from such spiritual visions, present at the core of all the world's living traditions, that we may derive the faith to become architects of a new order of cooperation.